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the point of divergence comes, as it must, with the solution.
Justice Jackson states the Courts' problem broadly thus:
"The Court's day to day task is to reject as false,
claims in the name of civil liberty which, if granted,
would paralyse or impair authority to defend existence
of our society, and to reject as false, claims in the name
of security which would undermine our freedoms and
open the way to oppression."
In the instant case the question then becomes: Do those
challenging the validity of the "belief" provisions of the
Section make false claims in the name of civil liberty, or
did Congress in enacting it make a false claim in the name
of security which should be struck down? That question
had to be faced by each and every one of the Justices in
making his decision for no way is open by which the ques-
tion can be by-passed and there are no objective tests
capable of application in making answer. One may state
the results and the variant positions taken, but to attempt
to rationalize or reconcile would seem futile and would be
perhaps misleading; the differences in view and in under-
lying philosophies seem both great and irreconcilable.
Personal views of the Justices as to the dignity to be
accorded the individual, the respect and deference due Con-
gressional findings, the reality and gravity of the threat of
Communist domination of labor unions, the authority of
Congress over all these areas of conflict, can perhaps never
be reconciled. We seem to have here an unalterable align-
ment of views and, as Justice Clark's prior activities as
Attorney General of the United States may well result in
his continued non-participation in cases raising similar is-
sues it seems that a continued deadlock is to be expected
for a somewhat indefinite period.
SEPARATION AGREEMENTS - THEIR
PRESENT STATUS?
Cronin et al. v. Hebditch'
On January 14, 1948, the plaintiff and the now deceased
John C. Hebditch were married. At that time she was
eighteen years of age and without any property of her own;
and he was seventy-one and worth in excess of $700,000.
174 A. 2d 50 (Md. 1950).
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They lived together as man and wife until March 20, 1948,
at which time she left him and went to live with her parents.
In September of that same year she filed a bill in Harford
County" 'for separate maintenance and for alimony' on the
grounds of 'cruelty of treatment'."'
On January 11, 1949, while still living apart, plaintiff
and her husband executed a separation agreement which
stated that " 'unfortunate differences have arisen..., which
renders it inadvisable that they further continue to live to-
gether', and 'they have agreed to separate and live apart
from each other until due action in the matter of a divorce
between them can be had, which action will be shortly
instituted in a court of equity, and.., they have come to an
agreement respecting the disposition of the property of
each'."3 It was further agreed that plaintiff should release
her husband from all obligations of further support, and
should also release him and his heirs and assigns from all
claims of any sort arising out of the marriage relationship
and further "that in said action for divorce or in any other
action for divorce growing out of this marriage, she will not
make any claim for alimony or counsel fees."4
The husband on his part similarly agreed to release his
wife from all claims arising out of the marriage. The agree-
ment further stated: "and the said husband, in considera-
tion of the premises, does hereby agree, conditioned upon a
decree for divorce, to pay unto the said wife ... [$9,000] ."'
One thousand dollars was to be paid at the signing of the
contemplated divorce decree and the remainder in ten
annual installments of $800 each, beginning in 1950. An
additional $1,000 was to be paid at the wife's demand for
costs and counsel fees arising out of her contemplated
divorce suit. Finally, the husband agreed to pay all of his
wife's income taxes upon the $10,000 over the eleven year
period; and she was to withdraw her suit for alimony, which
was then pending in Harford County.
Subsequent to the execution of this agreement, there
was definite evidence of a brief resumption of marital rela-
tions and a reconciliation alleged by the plaintiff-wife. This
occurred when she and her husband went to Florida to-
gether, she to stay with her aunt in West Palm Beach and he
in Miami.
'Ibid, 51.
3 Ibid.
'Ibid.
5 Ibid, 52.
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On March 24, 1949, the husband died at the age of
seventy-two. At the time of his death plaintiff still owned
no separate property and none jointly nor as tenant by the
entireties with him. There had been no children as a result
of the marriage.
Plaintiff then brought this bill in the Circuit Court of
Harford County against the successors in title or interest
to her deceased husband. By the bill plaintiff sought to
have declared null and void the separation agreement and
also three inter vivos transfers in trust. In addition, she
sought to have the assets, instead of the shares of stock, of
two corporations treated as assets of her husband or his
estate and one-third thereof distributed to her as his widow.
Plaintiff contended that the separation agreement was
void "(a) by reason of her infancy and 'the fact that it is
without consideration and is grossly unfair', (b) because,
if it is not void but voidable, she hereby repudiates it, (c)
because it is against public policy, and (d) because, if it
ever had any legal effect, it has been cancelled and annulled
by mutual agreement through reconciliation".' From an
order overruling demurrers to this bill the defendants
appealed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, and in its opinion by
Markell, J., stated that on the demurrers in question, it was
unnecessary to decide as to the validity of the trust agree-
ments. However, the Court held the separation agreement
to be invalid since it was an "unlawful agreement to obtain
a divorce and pay $9,000 for it, $1,000 c.o.d., the balance in
ten annual deferred payments".' The Court further held
that the agreement was "also an unjust device to deprive
the plaintiff-wife of her marital rights without any con-
sideration at all unless the divorce were obtained". 8 Accord-
ing to the opinion, the policy of the law would be better
served by protecting the plaintiff's marital rights than by
ruling against her and depriving her of those rights.
Although in the Court below, as well as on appeal, the
principal arguments revolved around the effect of the plain-
tiff's infancy on the validity of the separation agreement,
the Court of Appeals in arriving at its decision stated that
"we think, however, that we should not avoid the more
basic question, distinctly raised by the bill, whether, even
if plaintiff had been of full age, this separation agreement
would have been effective against her, either under the Act
4 Ibid, 53.
7 Ibid, 55.
8 Ibid.
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of 1931, Ch. 230 (Md. Code, Art. 16, Sec. 42) or independ-
ently of statute".
In the process of reaching its result the majority of the
Court then went on to state that the law as stated in Melson
v. Melson1" had not been materially altered by the Act of
1931. It based this conclusion upon the last paragraph of
the opinion in Campbell v. Campbell1 and quoted part of
that paragraph. Further strengthening its conclusion as to
the Melson case still being good law, the Court stated that:
".. . in the recent case of Kershaw v. Kershaw, 73 A. 2d 223,
we in effect followed the Barclay case'" in denying a divorce
Ibid, 53. The section of the statute referred to provides:
"Any deed or agreement made between husband and wife respecting
support, maintenance, property rights, or personal rights, or any settle-
ment made in lieu of support, maintenance, property rights or personal
rights shall be valid, binding and enforceable to every intent and pur-
pose, and such deed or agreement shall not be a bar to an action for
divorce, either a vinculo inatrimnoaii or a rnensa et toro, as the case
may be, whether the cause for divorce existed at the time or arose prior
or subsequent to the time of execution of said deed or agreement, or
whether at the time of making such deed or agreement the parties were
living together or apart; provided, that whenever any such deed or
agreement shall make provision for or in any manner affect the care,
custody, education or maintenance of any infant child or children of the
parties the court shall have the right to modify such deed or agreement
in respect to such infants as to the court may seem proper, looking
always to the best interests of such infants."
10151 Md. 196, 205, 134 A. 136, 139 (1926).
1174 Md. 229, 241, 198 A. 414, 419, 116 A. L. R. 939 (1938), noted 2 Md. L.
Rev. 357-363. This case arose under Chapter 39 of the Acts of 1937 which
repealed and reenacted Sec. 38 of Art. 16 of the Code of Public General Laws
with an amendment adding an additional supervenient ground for divorce
a vinculo matrinonii, namely, voluntarily living separate and apart for live
consecutive years prior to the filing of the bill and without any reasonable
expectation of reconciliation. (This period has now been changed from live
to three years by Md. Laws (1917), Ch. 240.)
After granting the divorce sought under this statute, the Court said in
the last of Its opinion, part of which was quoted in the principal case:
"The provision in the agreement as to the maintenance payments to
the defendant will not be affected by the divorce, as that stipulation is
in terms operative until her remarriage. In Melson v. Melson, supra.
151 Md. 196, at page 205 ... it was said in the opinion of the court. as
delivered by .Judge Parke: 'The agreement of separation was valid as
the agreed equivalent of future maintenance by the husband of the wife.
although it was invalid as a contract providing for the relinquishment
of the right and duty of cohabitation of the spouses.' The Act of 1981.
Ch. 220 (Code [Supp. 1935], Art. 16, See. 39A). provides :" (quoting the
Act in full and without further comment.)
This would hardly seem to form a basis for concluding that the law of
the Melson case has not been altered by the Act of 1931. If anything, it
would appear that the Court In the Campbell case was saying that the
agreement as to the maintenance payments would not be affected even under
the old law of Melson v. Melson and that now with the Act of 1931 in force
the agreement would without question be valid.
1Barclay v. Barclay, 98 Md. 366, 56 A. 804 (1904). This case held, in
effect, that a separation agreement may be an acquiescence in abandonment
and, therefore, a bar to a subsequent suit for divorce, although it is not
per 8e a bar to such a suit.
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to a spouse living separate pursuant to a separation agree-
ment - for less than the statutory period under the Act of
1937, Ch. 396, or the Act of 1947, Ch. 240 (Art. 16, Sec. 40,
1939 and 1947 Supp.)."'3 As a consequence of this reason-
ing, the Court found that the agreement between a penniless
wife and a wealthy husband showed on its face that it was
without consideration and was unjust and inequitable.
It said further that this injustice and inequity might be
avoided, without doing violence to the wording of the agree-
ment, by construing it as " 'conditioned upon a decree for
divorce' " and therefore ineffective. The Court implied,
however, that even this was unnecessary, because "the
agreement mentions no grounds for divorce and seems to
imply that none exists and that the divorce bargained for
is therefore to be a fraudulent divorce"."
"In the Kershaw case, 73 A. 223, husband and wife agreed to separate
and entered into a separation agreement pursuant to that decision. After
living part for over thirteen months but less than the required eighteen
months, they filed cross-bills for divorce, both on the grounds of desertion.
The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and dismissed both bills on
the grounds that, since the parties voluntarily separated and lived apart as
evidenced by, among other things, the separation agreement, they could not
obtain a divorce on the basis of desertion under our statute but must wait
the required period in order to obtain a divorce on the grounds of having
voluntarily lived apart for this time.
At page 225, Marbury, C.J., stated:
"It is our conclusion from all of these facts that these parties en-
tered into an agreement to live separately and have lived separately
pursuant to such agreement, but since the time at which a divorce
could be granted on that basis has not yet arrived. and since neither of
the parties make such a claim, but each relies on the desertion of the
other, both bills of complaint must be dismissed."
This would hardly seem to be a restatement of the rule in the Barclay
case as such, or, at least, in exactly the same light in which it would have
been construed immediately subsequent io the Molson case. Prior to the
Act of 1.937 and certainly prior to the Act of 1931, an agreement such as that
in the Kershaw case would have barred a divorce on the grounds of deser-
tion since the agreement itself would have been evidence of the fact that
there had been no abandonment. Under the Barclay case it would have been
construed to have been an acquiescence in the abandonment. Both parties
would have been equally guilty, and there could have been no divorce
because there were no other grounds for a divorce a vincllo under these
particular circumstances.
But with the Act of 1937 there was another ground added, that of volun-
tarily living apart. So it would seem, construing all of these together ani
in the light of the above quoted portion of Judge Marbury's opinion in the
Kershaw case, that all the rule of the Iarclay case would do today would
be to bar a divorce for desertion because of the separation agreement, but
certainly not bar a divorce a viuctilo on the additional grounds, after the
longer time requirement had been met.
In addition, the rule in the Melson case would appear to be no longer the
law since the Act of 1937 in effect authorizes a divorce a vinculo matrimooii
by the mutual consent of the parties after having lived apart voluntarily
and for the required time. Up until the decision in the principal case it
had been rather generally assumed that the policy which prompted the
Melson case was no longer the modern public policy.
1' Supra, n. 7.
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It seems singularly unfortunate that the Court should
have gone out of its way to base its decision on these
grounds. This is especially true when, as pointed out by
Henderson, J., in his concurring opinion, there were a num-
ber of other grounds upon which the same end result could
have been reached 5 and also in view of the uncertainty into
which the majority opinion now throws Article 16, Section
42 (the Act of 1931) and the validity of separation agree-
ments in general. Apparently this decision has, in effect,
unnecessarily weakened Section 42, and in addition has
revived the uncertain doctrine of the Melson case as it
applies to separation agreements, despite the seemingly
clear and steady development of our modern viewpoint
concerning divorce laws from the Barclay case through the
Melson case, the Act of 1931, the Acts of 1937,16 1941,'17 and
1949,18 and, finally, the Campbell case. 9 The Act of 1937
and the following acts crystallized this development, and in
them the legislature expressed the resultant change in pub-
lic policy away from the old idea that a divorce must em-
body the elements of a contest with the innocent, complain-
ing spouse establishing the guilt of the other. Instead, the
Acts added, in order, three new, non-guilt, supervenient
grounds for divorce, viz: voluntary separation, insanity and
imprisonment.
Another interesting question raised by the decision in
the principal case is its effect upon the Bushman case 20 and
15 74 A. 2d 50, 56:
"(1) that the agreement is voidable because of the infancy of the
appellee, (2) that the agreement is unfair in the light of the confidentialI
relationship, or (3) that the agreement is a fraud upon her marital
rights in the light of the circumstances alleged. The opinion of this
court glosses over these points and reaches out to rest the decision upon
the ground that the agreement on its face is unenforceable and illegal,
although the parties are not in pari delicto. I think this holding ignores
the plain language of the statute, substitutes the court's view of public
policy for that of the legislature, and decides the case on a point not
considered by the chancellor and not argued in this court."
10Ch. 396, amending and reenacting Art. 16. Sec. 38, Md. Code (1924).
(now Sec. 40, 1947 Supp.).
11 Ch. 497, adding Sec. 41A to Art. 16, Md. Code (1939).
Ch. 520, repealing and reenacting Art. 16. Sec. 40, Md. Code Supp. (1947).
"For a discussion of this historical development of Maryland divorce law
and policy apparently culminating in the Act of 1937 with its additional
supervenient ground for divorce a vivcuio iatrimoti. see 2 Md. L.-Rev., 357.
20 Bushman v. Bushman, 157 Md. 166, 145 A. 488 (1929). In this case plain-
tiff-wife sued defendant-husband for divorce a mensa et thoro on the ground
of cruelty. But by agreement between the parties entered into in February,
1918, a specific sum in gross was agreed upon to be paid by the husband to
the wife, a condition precedent to such payment being that plaintiff-wife
should amend the bill to one for a divorce a vinculo matrimonii. Some ten
years later the wife brought an action to have the husband imprisoned for
contempt for failure to pay the sum agreed upon.
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the principle stated therein concerning collusive agree-
ments to obtain a divorce. Bushman v. Bushman, decided
after the Melson case and before the Act of 1931, held that,
although it was a suspicious circumstance, it was not col-
lusion for one spouse to enter into an agreement to pay
the other spouse a specific sum upon the latter obtaining an
absolute divorce upon already existing bona fide grounds.'
Would there not seem to be less likelihood of collusion in
the principal case where, in effect, there was an agreement
by the husband to pay the plaintiff-wife a specific sum
conditioned upon the mere possibility of her obtaining a
divorce? And, in addition, in the instant case, although the
Court of Appeals spoke of a fraudulent divorce, there
appeared to be no evidence to that effect. There was none
mentioned by the Court of Appeals, other than the agree-
ment itself, nor was there any mention made of it in the
opinion of the lower court.
Viewed in this light it would seem that, under the cir-
cumstances of the case, this particular separation agreement
would, if anything, have lessened the likelihood of a wife
in her late teens going out of her way to obtain collusively
a fraudulent divorce for ten thousand dollars when, con-
sidering her husband's advanced age, she could in all proba-
bility, by merely doing nothing, have received several
hundred thousand dollars in a relatively few years time.
The Court held that the award in the decree was not alimony but, instead,
was an award for the payment of a specific sum in accordance with the
agreement of the parties and that, therefore, the defendant could not be
punished by imprisonment for contempt.
At page 170, the Court stated:
"The original bill of complaint was for a divorce a men.sa et tMoro
on the ground of cruelty, and the agreement mentioned was subject to
the condition precedent that the plaintiff should amend the bill to one
praying for an absolute divorce. This ... is a suspicious circumstance:
but, in the absence of any other testimony, and in view of the length of
time since the passage of the decree, and its complete acceptance by the
parties, the court could not now find, on this single equivocal fact. that
the decree was induced by the collusion of the parties, and should regard
it as having been made in an effort to secure proper provisions for
the maintenance of the wife, who was the innocent party, and for the
support of the children because of the Inevitable and imminent dissolu-
tion of the marital relation on account of an existing statutory basis
for a divorce a vinculo inatrimonii."
Ibild.
[VOL. X1
